We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs). An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and an adversary. We propose the UCSG algorithm that achieves a sublinear regret compared to the game value when competing with an arbitrary opponent. This result improves previous ones under the same setting. The regret bound has a dependency on the diameter, which is an intrinsic value related to the mixing property of SGs. If we let the opponent play an optimistic best response to the learner, UCSG finds an ε-maximin stationary policy with a sample complexity of O (poly(1/ε)), where ε is the gap to the best policy.
Introduction
Many real-world scenarios (e.g., markets, computer networks, board games) can be cast as multiagent systems. The framework of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) targets at learning to act in such systems. While in traditional reinforcement learning (RL) problems, Markov decision processes (MDPs) are widely used to model a single agent's interaction with the environment, stochastic games (SGs, [32] ), as an extension of MDPs, are able to describe multiple agents' simultaneous interaction with the environment. In this view, SGs are most well-suited to model MARL problems [24] .
In this paper, two-player zero-sum SGs are considered. These games proceed like MDPs, with the exception that in each state, both players select their own actions simultaneously 1 , which jointly determine the transition probabilities and their rewards . The zero-sum property restricts that the two players' payoffs sum to zero. Thus, while one player (Player 1) wants to maximize his/her total reward, the other (Player 2) would like to minimize that amount. Similar to the case of MDPs, the reward can be discounted or undiscounted, and the game can be episodic or non-episodic.
In the literature, SGs are typically learned under two different settings, and we will call them online and offline settings, respectively. In the offline setting, the learner controls both players in a centralized manner, and the goal is to find the equilibrium of the game [33, 21, 30] . This is also known as finding the worst-case optimality for each player (a.k.a. maximin or minimax policy). In this case, we care about the sample complexity, i.e., how many samples are required to estimate the worst-case optimality such that the error is below some threshold. In the online setting, the learner controls only one of the players, and plays against an arbitrary opponent [24, 4, 5, 8, 31] . In this case, we care about the learner's regret, i.e., the difference between some benchmark measure and the learner's total reward earned in the learning process. This benchmark can be defined as the total reward when both players play optimal policies [5] , or when Player 1 plays the best stationary response to Player 2 [4] . Some of the above online-setting algorithms can find the equilibrium simply through self-playing.
Most previous results on offline sample complexity consider discounted SGs. Their bounds depend heavily on the chosen discount factor [33, 21, 30, 31] . However, as noted in [5, 19] , the discounted setting might not be suitable for SGs that require long-term planning, because only finite steps are relevant in the reward function it defines. This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to give an offline sample complexity bound of orderÕ (poly(1/ε)) in the average-reward (undiscounted and non-episodic) setting, where ε is the error parameter. A major difference between our algorithm and previous ones is that the two players play asymmetric roles in our algorithm: by focusing on finding only one player's worst-case optimal policy at a time, the sampling can be rather efficient. This resembles but strictly extends [13] 's methods in finding the maximin action in a two-stage game.
In the online setting, we are only aware of [5] 's R-MAX algorithm that deals with average-reward SGs and provides a regret bound. Considering a similar scenario and adopting the same regret definition, we significantly improve their bounds (see Appendix A for details). Another difference between our algorithm and theirs is that ours is able to output a currently best stationary policy at any stage in the learning process, while theirs only produces a T ε -step fixed-horizon policy for some input parameter T ε . The former could be more natural since the worst-case optimal policy is itself a stationary policy.
The techniques used in this paper are most related to RL for MDPs based on the optimism principle [2, 19, 9 ] (see Appendix A). The optimism principle built on concentration inequalities automatically strikes a balance between exploitation and exploration, eliminating the need to manually adjust the learning rate or the exploration ratio. However, when importing analysis from MDPs to SGs, we face the challenge caused by the opponent's uncontrollability and non-stationarity. This prevents the learner from freely exploring the state space and makes previous analysis that relies on stationary distribution's perturbation analysis [2] useless. In this paper, we develop a novel way to replace the opponent's non-stationary policy with a stationary one in the analysis (introduced in Section 5.1), which facilitates the use of techniques based on perturbation analysis. We hope that this technique can benefit future analysis concerning non-stationary agents in MARL.
One related topic is the robust MDP problem [29, 17, 23] . It is an MDP where some state-action pairs have adversarial rewards and transitions. It is often assumed in robust MDP that the adversarial choices by the environment are not directly observable by the Player, but in our SG setting, we assume that the actions of Player 2 can be observed. However, there are still difficulties in SG that are not addressed by previous works on robust MDP.
Here we compare our work to [23] , a recent work on learning robust MDP. In their setting, there are adversarial and stochastic state-action pairs, and their proposed OLRM2 algorithm tries to distinguish them. Under the scenario where the environment is fully adversarial, which is the counterpart to our setting, the worst-case transitions and rewards are all revealed to the learner, and what the learner needs to do is to perform a maximin planning. In our case, however, the worst-case transitions and rewards are still to be learned, and the opponent's arbitrary actions may hinder the learner to learn this information. We would say that the contribution of [23] is orthogonal to ours.
Other lines of research that are related to SGs are on MDPs with adversarially changing reward functions [11, 27, 28, 10] and with adversarially changing transition probabilities [35, 1] . The assumptions in these works have several differences with ours, and therefore their results are not comparable to our results. However, they indeed provide other viewpoints about learning in stochastic games.
Preliminaries Game Models and Policies.
A SG is a 4-tuple M = (S, A, r, p). S denotes the state space and A = A 1 × A 2 the players' joint action space. We denote S = |S| and A = |A|. The game starts from an initial state s 1 . Suppose at time t the players are at state s t . After the players play [R T (M, π, s)], whenever the limit exists. In fact, the game value exists 2 [26] :
s) .
If ρ(M, π, s) or ρ * (M, s) does not depend on the initial state s, we simply write ρ(M, π) or ρ * (M ).
The Bias Vector. For a stationary policy π, the bias vector h(M, π, ·) is defined, for each coordinate s, as
The bias vector satisfies the Bellman equation: ∀s ∈ S,
The vector h(M, π, ·) describes the relative advantage among states under model M and (joint) policy π. The advantage (or disadvantage) of state s compared to state s ′ under policy π is defined as the difference between the accumulated rewards with initial states s and s ′ , which, from (1), converges to the difference h(M, π, s) − h(M, π, s ′ ) asymptotically. For the ease of notation, the span of a vector v is defined as sp(v) := max i v i − min i v i . Therefore if a model, together with any policy, induces large sp (h), then this model will be difficult to learn because visiting a bad state costs a lot in the learning process. As shown in [3] for the MDP case, the regret has an inevitable dependency on sp(h(M, π * , ·)), where π * is the optimal policy.
On the other hand, sp(h(M, π, ·)) is closely related to the mean first passage time under the Markov chain induced by M and π. Actually we have
, where T π s→s ′ (M ) denotes the expected time to reach state s ′ starting from s when the model is M and the player(s) follow the (joint) policy π. This fact is intuitive, and the proof can be seen at Remark M.1.
Notations.
In order to save space, we often write equations in vector or matrix form. We use vectors inequalities:
.., n. For a general matrix game with matrix G of size n × m, we denote the value of the game as val G := max
where ∆ k is the probability simplex of dimension k. In SGs, given the estimated value function u(s ′ ) ∀s ′ , we often need to solve the following matrix game equation:
and this is abbreviated with the vector form v = val{r + P u}. We also use solve 1 G and solve 2 G to denote the optimal solutions of p and q. In addition, the indicator function is denoted by ½{·} or ½ {·} .
Problem Settings and Results Overview
We assume that the game proceeds for T steps. In order to have meaningful regret bounds (i.e., sublinear to T ), we must make some assumptions to the SG model itself. Our two different assumptions are
Why we make these assumptions is as follows. Consider an SG model where the opponent (Player 2) has some way to lock the learner (Player 1) to some bad state. The best strategy for the learner might be to totally avoid, if possible, entering that state. However, in the early stage of the learning process, the learner won't know this, and he/she will have a certain probability to visit that state and get locked. This will cause linear regret to the learner. Therefore, we assume the following: whatever policy the opponent executes, the learner always has some way to reach any state within some bounded time. This is essentially our Assumption 2.
Assumption 1 is the stronger one that actually implies that under any policies executed by the players (not necessarily stationary, see Remark M.2), every state is visited within an average of D steps. We find that under this assumption, the asymptotic regret can be improved. This assumption also has a sense similar to those required for Q-learning-type algorithms' convergence: they require that every state be visited infinitely often. See [18] for example.
These assumptions define some notion of diameters that are specific to the SG model. It is known that under Assumption 1 or Assumption 2, both players have optimal stationary policies, and the game value is independent of the initial state. Thus we can simply write ρ * (M, s) as ρ * (M ). For a proof of these facts, please refer to Theorem E.1 in the appendix.
Two Settings and Results Overview
We focus on training Player 1 and discuss two settings. In the online setting, Player 1 competes with an arbitrary Player 2. The regret is defined as
In the offline setting, we control both Player 1 and Player 2's actions, and find Player 1's maximin policy. The sample complexity is defined as
where π 1 t is a stationary policy being executed by Player 1 at time t. This definition is similar to those in [20, 19] for one-player MDPs. By the definition of L ε , if we have an upper bound for L ε and run the algorithm for T > L ε steps, there is some t such that π 1 t is ε-optimal. We will explain how to pick this t in Section 7 and Appendix L.
It turns out that we can use almost the same algorithm to handle these two settings. Since learning in the online setting is more challenging, from now on we will mainly focus on the online setting, and leave the discussion about the offline setting at the end of the paper. Our results can be summarized by the following two theorems. 
4 Upper Confidence Stochastic Game Algorithm (UCSG) 3 We write, "with high probability, g =Õ(f )" or "w.h.p., g =Õ(f )" to indicate "with probability ≥ 1 − δ, g = f1O(f ) + f2", where f1, f2 are some polynomials of log D, log S, log A, log T, log(1/δ).
Algorithm 1 UCSG
2. Update the confidence set: M k = {M : ∀s, a,p(·|s, a) ∈ P k (s, a)}, where
; observe the reward r t and the next state s t+1 . Set v k (s t , a t ) = v k (s t , a t ) + 1 and t = t + 1. until ∃(s, a) such that v k (s, a) = n k (s, a) end for Definitions of confidence regions:
The Upper Confidence Stochastic Game algorithm (UCSG) (Algorithm 1) extends UCRL2 [19] , using the optimism principle to balance exploitation and exploration. It proceeds in phases (indexed by k), and only changes the learner's policy π 1 k at the beginning of each phase. The length of each phase is not fixed a priori, but depends on the statistics of past observations.
In the beginning of each phase k, the algorithm estimates the transition probabilities using empirical frequenciesp k (·|s, a) observed in previous phases (Step 1). With these empirical frequencies, it can then create a confidence region P k (s, a) for each transition probability. The transition probabilities lying in the confidence regions constitute a set of plausible stochastic game models M k , where the true model M belongs to with high probability (Step 2). Then, Player 1 optimistically picks one model M 1 k from M k , and finds the optimal (stationary) policy π 1 k under this model (Step 3). Finally, Player 1 executes the policy π 1 k for a while until some (s, a)-pair's number of occurrences is doubled during this phase (Step 4). The count v k (s, a) records the number of steps the (s, a)-pair is observed in phase k; it is reset to zero in the beginning of every phase.
In
Step 3, to pick an optimistic model and a policy is to pick
where γ k denotes the error parameter for MAXIMIN-EVI. The LHS of (2) is well-defined because Player 2 has stationary optimal policy under the MDP induced by M 1 k and π 1 k . Roughly speaking, (2) says that min is equivalent to selecting an action in A 1 and simultaneously selecting an admissible transition probability in the confidence region P k (·, ·).
Suppose that M ∈ M k , then the extended SG M + satisfies Assumption 2 because the true model M is embedded in M + . By Theorem E.1 in Appendix E, it has a constant game value ρ * (M + ) independent of the initial state, and satisfies Bellman equation of the form val{r + P f } = ρ · e + f , for some bounded function f (·), where e stands for the all-one constant vector. With the above conditions, we can use value iteration with Schweitzer transform (a.k.a. aperiodic transform) [34] to solve the optimal policy in the extended EG M + . We call it MAXIMIN-EVI. For the details of MAXIMIN-EVI, please refer to Appendix F. We only summarize the result with the following Lemma. 
Before diving into the analysis under the two assumptions, we first establish the following fact. Lemma 4.2. With high probability, the true model M ∈ M k for all phases k.
It is proved in Appendix D. With Lemma 4.2, we can fairly assume M ∈ M k in most of our analysis.
Analysis under Assumption 1
In this section, we import analysis techniques from one-player MDPs [2, 19, 22, 9] . We also develop some techniques that deal with non-stationary opponents.
We model Player 2's behavior in the most general way, i.e., assuming it using a history-dependent randomized policy. Let H t = (s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , ..., s t−1 , a t−1 , r t−1 , s t ) ∈ H t be the history up to s t , then we assume π 2 t to be a mapping from H t to a distribution over A 2 . We will simply write π 2 t (·) and hide its dependency on H t inside the subscript t. A similar definition applies to π 1 t (·). With abuse of notations, we denote by k(t) the phase where step t lies in, and thus our algorithm uses policy π 1 t (·) = π 1 k(t) (·|s t ). The notations π 1 t and π 1 k are used interchangeably. Let T k := t k+1 − t k be the length of phase k. We decompose the regret in phase k in the following way:
in which we define
k is some stationary policy of Player 2 which will be defined later. Since the actions of Player 2 are arbitrary,π 2 k is imaginary and only exists in analysis. Note that under Assumption 1, any stationary policy pair over M induces an irreducible Markov chain, so we do not need to specify the initial states for ρ(M, π (3) . Among the four terms, Λ (2) k is clearly non-positive, and Λ
(1) k , by optimism, can be bounded using Lemma 4.1. Now remains to bound Λ 
Bounding
k involve the artificial policyπ 2 k , which is a stationary policy that replaces Player 2's non-stationary policy in the analysis. This replacement costs some constant regret but facilitates the use of perturbation analysis in regret bounding. The selection ofπ 2 k is based on the principle that the behavior (e.g., total number of visits to some (s, a)) of the Markov chain induced by M, π 1 k ,π 2 k should be close to the empirical statistics. Intuitively,π 2 k can be defined as
Note two things, however. First, since we need the actual trajectory in defining this policy, it can only be defined after phase k has ended. Second,π 2 k can be undefined because the denominator of (4) can be zero. However, this will not happen in too many steps. Actually, we have Lemma 5.1.
with high probability.
Before describing how we bound the regret with the help ofπ 2 k and the perturbation analysis, we establish the following lemma:
Lemma 5.2. We say the transition probability at time step t is ε-accurate if |p
We let B t (ε) = 1 if the transition probability at time t is ε-accurate; otherwise B t (ε) = 0. Then for any state s, with high probability,
Now we are able to sketch the logic behind our proofs. Let's assume thatπ To continue, we resort to the perturbation analysis for the mean first passage times (developed in Appendix C). Lemma 5.2 shows that M 1 k will not be far from M for too many steps. Then Theorem C.9 in Appendix C tells that if
The above approach leads to Lemma 5.3, which is a key in our analysis. We first define some notations. Under Assumption 1, any pair of stationary policies induces an irreducible Markov chain, which has a unique stationary distribution. If the policy pair π = (π 1 , π 2 ) is executed, we denote its
We say a phase k is benign if the following hold true:
∀s. We can show the following:
Finally, for benign phases, we can have the following two lemmas.
4 The argument in [19] is simple: Lemma 5.5.
AT + DS 2 A) with high probability, Proof of Theorem 3.1. The regret proof starts from the decomposition of (3). Λ
( 1) k is bounded with the help of Lemma 4.1:
k ≤ 0 by definition. Then with Lemma 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, we can bound Λ (3)
6 Analysis under Assumption 2
In Section 5, the main ingredient of regret analysis lies in bounding the span of the bias vector,
However, the same approach does not work because under the weaker Assumption 2, we do not have a bound on the mean first passage time under arbitrary policy pairs. Hence we adopt the approach of approximating the average reward SG problem by a sequence of finite-horizon SGs: on a high level, first, with the help of Assumption 2, we approximate the T multiple of the original average-reward SG game value (i.e. the total reward in hindsight) with the sum of those of H-step episodic SGs; second, we resort to [9]'s results to bound the H-step SGs' sample complexity and translates it to regret.
Approximation by repeated episodic SGs. For the approximation, the quantity H does not appear in UCSG but only in the analysis. The horizon T is divided into episodes each with length H. Index episodes with i = 1, ..., T /H, and denote episode i's first time step by τ i . We say i ∈ ph(k) if all H steps of episode i lie in phase k. Define the H-step expected reward under joint policy π with initial state s as V H (M, π, s) := E H t=1 r t |a t ∼ π, s 1 = s . Now we decompose the regret in phase k as
Here, π 2 i denotes Player 2's policy in episode i, which may be non-stationary. ∆
k comes from the possible two incomplete episodes in phase k. ∆
( 1) k is related to the tolerance level we set for the MAXIMIN-EVI algorithm:
k is an error caused by approximating an infinite-horizon SG by a repeated episodic H-step SG (with possibly different initial states). ∆ (3) k is clearly non-positive. It remains to bound ∆
k ≤Õ( √ HT ) with high probability.
From sample complexity to regret bound. As the main contributor of regret, ∆
k corresponds to the inaccuracy in the transition probability estimation. Here we largely reuse [9] 's results where they consider one-player episodic MDP with a fixed initial state distribution. Their main lemma states that the number of episodes in phases such that
, where s 0 is their initial state in each episode. In other words,
. Note that their proof allows π k to be an arbitrarily selected non-stationary policy for phase k.
We can directly utilize their analysis and we summarize it as Theorem K.1 in the appendix. While their algorithm has an input ε, this input can be removed without affecting bounds. This means that the PAC bounds holds for arbitrarily selected ε. With the help of Theorem K.1, we have
k ≤Õ(S √ HAT + HS 2 A) with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. With the decomposition (5) and the help of Lemma 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, the regret is bounded byÕ(
Sample Complexity of Offline Training
In Section 3.1, we defined L ε to be the sample complexity of Player 1's maximin policy. In our offline version of UCSG, in each phase k we let both players each select their own optimistic policy. After Player 1 has optimistically selected π 
when value iteration halts. With this selection rule, we are able to obtain the following theorems.
Theorem 7.2. Let Assumption 2 hold, and further assume that max
The algorithm can output a single stationary policy for Player 1 with the following guarantee: if we run the offline version of UCSG for T > L ε steps, the algorithm can output a single stationary policy that is ε-optimal. We show how to output this policy in the proofs of Theorem 7.1 and 7.2.
Open Problems
In this work, we obtain the regret ofÕ(
A natural open problem is how to improve these bounds on both asymptotic and constant terms. A lower bound of them can be inherited from the one-player MDP setting, which is Ω(
Another open problem is that if we further weaken the assumptions to
can we still learn the SG? We have argued that if we only have this assumption, in general we cannot get sublinear regret in the online setting. However, it is still possible to obtain polynomial-time offline sample complexity if the two players cooperate to explore the state-action space. [6] Sébastien Bubeck and Aleksandrs Slivkins. The best of both worlds: Stochastic and adversarial bandits. In Conference on Learning Theory, 2012.
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A Previous Bounds for MDPs and SGs
The techniques we use in this paper are most related to the probably approximately correct (PAC) analysis for RL algorithms. Some rather complete reviews of the related works are provided in [19, 9] sample complexity. The additional D dependency is resolved by [22, 9] , though in discounted and episodic settings respectively. These two works leverage the Bellman equation for local variance and obtained sample complexity bounds of orderÕ
(γ: discount factor, H: fixed horizon length), making their gaps with the lower bounds Ω SA ε 2 (1−γ) 3 and Ω
remain only an order of S.
The scenario that most resembles ours in the literature is that considered in [5] , who proposed the algorithm R-MAX. R-MAX is an optimism-based algorithm that can be used to learn stochastic games with arbitrary opponents. However, the algorithm depends on a parameter ε and the ε-return mixing time T ε that need to be known in advance. This ε-return mixing time resembles our D ε in Assumption 2. As a result, theirÕ
, while our bound isÕ
Another difference lies in that the output policy of our algorithm is a stationary one, rather than a T ε -step non-stationary policy as in R-MAX.
B Inequalities
Lemma B.1. (Azuma-Hoeffding's inequality. Theorem 4.2 of [6]) Let F 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F T be a filtration, and Y 1 , · · · , Y T real random variables such that Y t is F t -measurable, (Y t |F t−1 ) = 0 and Y t ∈ [A t , A t + c t ] where A t is a random variable F t−1 -measurable and c t is a positive constant. Then with probability at least 1 − δ,
Lemma B.2. (Bernstein inequality. Lemma 4.4 of [6]) Let F 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F T be a filtration, and
Then with probability at least 1 − δ,
C Perturbation Bounds for Markov Chains
Perturbation analysis for Markov chains plays an important role in analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g., [2] ). Those analyses mainly center around the question that when the transition probabilities of a Markov chain are perturbed by a little, how much stationary distributions or mean first passage times (as defined in Definition C.1) will change. While in [2] , the perturbation bound for stationary distributions is used, we further use that of the mean first passage time to get a tighter regret bound.
In this section, we use i, j to index states, and use µ i to denote the stationary distribution of state i in an irreducible Markov chain. Definition C.1 (Mean first passage time). In a Markov chain, we define T ij to be the expected time to reach state j starting from state i. In the case i = j, T ii is the expected time to return to state i when starting from i. Thus T ij ≥ 1 always holds whether i = j or not.
C.1 Perturbation Bounds for Stationary Distribution Theorem C.2 (Proposition 2.2 of [7]
). Let C andC be two irreducible Markov chains with the same state space S. Let their transition matrices be P ,P , and stationary distributions be µ,μ. Let E =P − P and use · ∞ to represent the largest absolute value in a matrix, then ∀j,
With a little modification on the proof of Theorem C.2, we can actually have the following lemma, which only requires that C be an irreducible Markov chain.
Theorem C.3. Let C be an irreducible Markov chain, andC be some Markov chain with the same state space S as C. Let their transition matrices be P ,P , and let C's stationary distributions be µ. Let E =P − P . If E ∞ < 2/(S max i =j T ij ), thenC is also an irreducible Markov chain; furthermore, the stationary distribution ofC,μ, satisfies ∀j,
Proof. Let P * andP * be the Cesaro limits of P andP , which is defined by P * = lim T →∞ 1 T T t=1 P t−1 . Then we have P * (I − P ) = 0,P * (I −P ) =P * (I − P − E) = 0, and thus (P * − P * )(I − P ) =P * E. IfP induces an irreducible Markov chain,P * will have all identical rows and all positive elements. Suppose not, we can still extract its k-th row, which corresponds to the stationary distribution when starting from state k. Let this k-th row's j-th element beμ k j . We can write (μ k j − µ j )(I − P ) =μ k j E. Then following the same proof as in [7] or by [16] 's Theorem 2.1, we still have
Now since E ∞ ≤ 2/(S max i =j T ij ) and µ j > 0 ∀j, we haveμ k j > 0 ∀j, k. This means that every state is recurrent and reachable from each other, implying thatP induces an irreducible Markov chain.
C.2 Perturbation Bounds for Mean First Passage Time
The main result of this subsection is stated in Theorem C.9. It is developed with the help of Theorem C.5 to Theorem C.8.
Definition C.4 (g-inverse, Definition 3.1 of [15]).
A g-inverse of a matrix A is any matrix G such that AGA = A. Theorem C.5 (Theorem 5. 3 of [16] ). Let C be an irreducible Markov chain with stochastic matrix P . Let T ij be the first passage time from state i to state j, and let G be any g-inverse of I − P . We have
The below theorem introduces a special g-inverse that is convenient for our use.
Theorem C.6 (Theorem 3.3 of [15]
). Let P be a stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain. Let p ⊤ n denote the n-th row of P , and e n denote the unit column vector with n-th component being 1. Then I − P + e n p ⊤ n is non-singular, and G = (I − P + e n p ⊤ n ) −1 is a g-inverse of I − P .
Theorem C.7 (Section 5 of [16]).
LetP be a stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain perturbed from another stochastic matrix P of an irreducible Markov chain. Suppose that the perturbation only occurs at the n-th row of P (i.e. p ⊤ i =p ⊤ i ∀i = n). Define G as that in Theorem C.6. Then G =G.
Suppose that the perturbation only occurs at the n-th row, and let G = (I − P + e n p ⊤ n ) −1 . Then Theorem C.5 and C.7 together imply that for i = j,
with T jj = 1/µ j andT jj = 1/μ j (Corollary 5.3.1 of [16] ). Here we see thatT in = T in , ∀i.
Lemma C.8. Let P be the stochastic matrix of an irreducible Markov chain, and let G = (I − P + e n p ⊤ n ) −1 . If all mean first passage times are bounded by
Proof. We first verify that
where P n is obtained by deleting the n-th row and n-th column of P (without loss of generality, assume that the n-th row is last row of G).
Directly expanding I − P + e n p ⊤ n , we get
To verify that (I − P + e n p ⊤ n ) −1 takes the form of (10), one only needs to verify that (I − P n )e + d = 0. This can be seen by (I − P n )e = e − P n e = (1, ..., 1) − (
Note that the dimension of e i and e are n in the second expression of (11), while are n − 1 in the third expression. By [7] 's Equation (2.3), e ⊤ i (I − P n ) −1 e = T in . One can also see this by observing that (I − P n ) −1 = I + P n + P 2 n + · · · , and e ⊤ i P m n e j is "the probability of staying at j after m steps from i, while not visiting n in any of the m steps". Summing e ⊤ i P m n e j over j and m, the physical meaning becomes the mean first passage time from i to n, and the mathematical expression becomes e
We now combine (9) with (8) and Lemma C.8. Assuming that T ij ≤ D ′ , we have for i = j,
With (8) and (12) available, we now consider a general perturbation, which can actually be decomposed as S single-row perturbations.
Theorem C.9. Let P ,P be the original and the perturbed stochastic matrices, and let {T ij }, {T ij } be their corresponding mean first passage times. If max ij T ij ≤ D and
Proof. We do this general perturbation of P by perturbing one row at a time. This procedure will repeat for S times.
Suppose that the original stationary distribution and first passage times are denoted by µ
i and T
ij , and that those after n-th perturbation are denoted byμ
We prove the following facts by induction:
for n = 1, ..., S. Since n ≤ S, these induction hypotheses implicitly imply that
because (1 − 1/(8S)) S ≥ 1/2 for all S ≥ 1. Now we start the induction. The base case for n = 0 clearly holds. Suppose that (13)- (14) hold for all n ≤ k. Then by (8) we have
(k+1) . On the other hand, by (12), for i = j, we haveT
In the case i = j, we haveT
D Lemmas for Failing Events
Lemma D.1 (Proposition 18 of [19] ). The number of phases is upper bounded by U max = SA log 2 T .
Proof. Since phase changes only occur when the sample count of some (s, a 1 , a 2 ) is doubled, those changes corresponding to a specific (s, a 1 , a 2 ) is upper bounded by log 2 T . Considering all states and actions, the total number of phase changes is upper bounded by SA log 2 T .
Lemma D.2 (Lemma 17 of [19]).
For some specific k, s and a, the event p(·|s, a) ∈ CONF 1 (p k (·|s, a), n k (s, a)) holds with probability at least 1 − δ 1 .
Proof. Please refer to [19] . ]). For some specific k, s and a, the event p(·|s, a) ∈ CONF 2 (p k (·|s, a), n k (s, a)) holds with probability at least 1 − Sδ 1 .
Proof. Please refer to [9] or [25].
Proof of Lemma 4.2. By Lemma D.1, there are at most SA log 2 T confidence set updates to consider. Each update involves only a specificp(·|s, a) (totally S entries). By Lemma D.2, D.3 and using the union bound, the event M ∈ M k ∀k holds with probability at least 1 − SA log 2 T × (δ 1 + Sδ 1 ) ≥ 1 − δ.
E Lemmas for Stationary Optimal Policies
Theorem E.1. Given a stochastic game M = (S, A, r, p), where S is countable, A = A 1 × A 2 a compact metric space and both r(s, ·) ∈ [0, 1] and p(s ′ |s, ·) are continuous in a = (a 1 , a 2 ). Suppose Assumption 2 holds for M . Then there exist maximin stationary policies π * = (π 1 * , π 2 * ) for the two-player zero-sum stochastic game, the maximin stationary policies attain the game value ρ * , which is independent of the initial state, and there is a bounded function h(·) which together with ρ * satisfies the following Bellman equation. That is, for all state s,
To prove this, we use the following lemma which connects the boundedness of mean first passage times with the uniform boundedness of sp(V * α (·)) for all discount factor 0 < α < 1, where V * α (·) is the discounted game value defined as V * α (s) = max π 1 min π 2 π 1 ,π 2 ∞ t=1 α t−1 r t |s 1 = s . It is known that for any discount factor 0 < α < 1, discounted SGs always have maximin stationary policies π α = (π 1 , a 2 ) ≤ 1. Suppose ∀s, s ′ ∈ S and for any π 2 ∈ Π SR for Player 2, there exists a π 1 ∈ Π SR for Player 1 such that the mean first passage time T
Proof. Fix s, s
′ ∈ S. Fix a discount factor 0 < α < 1. For a fixed pair of maximin stationary policies π α = (π
, thus recursively, for any time step T ≥ 1, we have
where
denote the expectation conditioned on initial state being s, and the players executing the policy pair (π 1 , π 2 ). Hence for any stopping time τ ,
In particular, by choosing τ as the hitting time of s ′ from s,
For the first inequality we used V α (s τ ) = V α (s ′ ) and for the second, the non-negativity of r(s, a) and Jensen's inequality. The equality holds since the expected value of hitting time is the mean first passage time T
s→s ′ . The third inequality is essentially α x ≥ (α − 1)x + 1 for x ≥ 1; the fourth (1 − α)V α ≤ 1. For the last inequality we used the assumption that there exists some π 1 for which
| is uniformly bounded for all 0 < α < 1 and for any s, s ′ ∈ S. Then there exist a pair of maximin stationary policies π = (π 1 * , π 2 * ) attaining the game value ρ * which is independent of the initial state and a bounded function h(·) for which the following equations hold. For all state s,
Proof. For any discount factor 0 < α < 1,
Subtracting both sides by V * α (s 1 ) for some fixed state s 1 , and defining v α (s) : 2) , all of which are contained in compact subsets/spaces, by using diagonalization argument and by Lebesgue convergence theorem, we can obtain a sequence α k → 1, a bounded function h, and a constant ρ 2) , and
Algorithm 2 Value Iteration with Schweitzer transform
as k → ∞. Hence in the limit, for all state s,
F MAXIMIN-EVI and Its Convergence
As noted in Section 4.1, MAXIMIN-EVI proceeds simply by applying value iteration (Algorithm 2) on M + . The output of the algorithm is a value vector with tolerable errors. The val{r + P v i−1 } term in Algorithm 2 becomes
The inner maximization can be efficiently solved with linear programming. The MAXIMIN-EVI(M k , γ k ) in UCSG is then done by running Algorithm 2 with the evaluation of (17) in every iteration.
The following three lemmas characterize the convergence of the algorithm, and the properties of its outputs when converged. Lemma F.1 gaurantees that MAXIMIN-EVI converges. Lemma F.2 shows that when the algorithm halts, the output policy's worst-case average reward does not deviate from the maximin reward by more than γ. Lemma F.3 shows that the output value vector has a span no more than D. 
be the Cesaro limit of P π . Applying it on both sides of the inequality, we get De
be the optimal policy pair and
In a similar way, one can prove that
Lemma F.3. If Assumption 2 holds for some model M , then value iteration procedure in Algorithm 2 will always produce value functions with spans bounded by D. That is,
Proof. Note that value iteration with Schweitzer transform is equivalent to the following procedure. First modify the transition kernel and reward by p α (s
; then do the normal value iteration by v i = val{r α + P α v i−1 }. By the principle of dynamic programming, v i is the maximin expected reward in the i-step game under the transformed model.
The transformed model is equivalent to the system where at each time step, the state remains same as the previous one with probability α, and within that step there is no reward obtained/paid.
Clearly, in this new game, the advantage of starting from state s than starting from state s ′ (which can be calculated by
is no more than that in the original game. In the original game, by a similar argument as Remark 8 in [19] , this advantage difference is bounded by D. This then implies the argument in the lemma.
G Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2 directly follows from Lemma G.1 and G.2.
In this proof, we borrow the technique used in [22] and [9] to bound the number of steps with inaccurate transition probabilities (while they use this technique to bound the number of steps with inaccurate game value). Note here again that π t (·) can represent any history-dependent policy, and we hide its parameter H t = (s 1 , a 1 , r 1 , ..., s t ) inside the subscript of t.
Define the importance of a joint action a at time t as ι t (a) := max z j : z j ≤ π t (a) w min , and the its knownness as
with z 1 = 0, z j = 2 j−2 ∀j = 2, 3, ..., and some pre-defined w min > 0, m > 0. Note that we can always define them in hindsight even though the learner does not know π 2 t . These two amounts make partitions to the action set available at s t . The partitioning is based on the actions' probability of being selected at time t (i.e., π t (a)), and the accuracy it has been estimated (the larger n k(t) (s t , a), the more accurate). Intuitively, the larger κ t (a), the less likely will action a contribute to inaccurate transition probability estimation. Define the partitions by X t,κ,ι := {a : κ t (a) = κ and ι t (a) = ι}, ∀κ, ι. , with some 0 < ε < 1, we can prove the following lemmas. Lemma G.1. For any s, any κ and any ι > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ,
Lemma G.2. If for all κ and all ι > 0 we have |X t,κ,ι | ≤ κ, then for any plausiblep in the confidence set M k(t) , |p(s
G.1 Proof of Lemma G.1
We prove Lemma G.1 with the help of Lemma G.3 and G.4.
Lemma G.3. For any s, κ, and ι > 0,
Proof. First fix a. By the definition of importance, if a ∈ X t,κ,ι , then ιw min ≤ π t (a) < 2ιw min . In the case κ > 0, we also have mκπ t (a) ≤ n k(t) (s t , a) < 2mκπ t (a). They two together imply mκιw min ≤ n k(t) (s t , a) < 4mκιw min . This last inequality says that any (s, a) cannot be sampled in the partition (κ, ι) for more than about 3mκιw min times. This is because when (s, a) is sampled once (i.e., s t = s, a t = a), n k(t) (s, a) will be increased by one, and this cannot happen for more than 4mκιw min − mκιw min times while (s, a) ∈ X t,κ,ι . Since UCSG only updates n k (s, a) when new phases start and doubling the sample count of a state-action triple incurs a phase change, we use a more conservative bound of 6mκιw min . That is, we have
In the case κ = 0, we have n k(t) (s t , a) < mπ t (a) < 2mιw min . Thus similarly, the sample counts of (s, a) in the partition (κ, ι) cannot exceed 4mιw min . The cases of κ > 0 and κ = 0 can then be combined into a single one:
Summing (19) over all actions leads to the statement in the lemma.
Now we sketch the argument of the next lemma. When ι > 0, each action in X t,κ,ι are to be sampled with probability no less than ιw min . If furthermore |X t,κ,ι | is large, the probability that some a ∈ X t,κ,ι is sampled will be also large. However by Lemma G.3, the total times elements in partition (κ, ι) are sampled are upper bounded. Therefore, we can conclude that |X t,κ,ι | cannot be large for too many steps. Formally, we have Lemma G.4. With probability at least 1 − δ,
Proof. To prove Lemma G.4, we need the help of Lemma B.2.
Let F t−1 = H t = (s 1 , a 1 , r 1 · · · , s t−1 , a t−1 , r t−1 , s t ) and
where we define
Then Lemma B.2's conditions are met with b = 1. Moreover,
Substituting them into Lemma B.2 and rearraging terms, we get that with probability ≥ 1 − δ,
Solving the above inequality with respect to T t=1 q t , we can bound with probability ≥ 1 − δ that
Finally we look at q t . Since each action in X t,κ,ι are drawn at time t with probability at least ιw min , we have
Combining (20), (21), and noting that ½ st=s ½ at∈Xt,κ,ι ≥ ½ st=s ½ |Xt,κ,ι|>κ ½ at∈Xt,κ,ι concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma G.1. Combining Lemma G.3 and G.4, we have
½ st=s ½ |Xt,κ,ι|>κ ≤ 12Am + 9 (κ + 1)ιw min (22) with probability no less than 1 − δ. The lemma is then proved by substituting the selection of m and w min into (22), and using κ + 1 ≥ 1, ι ≥ 1.
G.2 Proof of Lemma G.2
Proof of Lemma G.2. To prove Lemma 5.1 and 5.3, the following lemma is a useful tool. In the following texts, we let v k (s) := t k+1 −1 t=t k ½ st=s , and write the joint policy (π
Proof. Under Assumption 1, the times a state is visited within an interval of length D is in average no less than 1 (no matter what policies the players play). Consider any arbitrarily chosen time frame
In this time frame, there are ⌊
2D ⌋ intervals each with length 2D. By Markov's inequality, the probability s is visited at least once within each interval is lower bounded by 1 2 . With Azuma-Hoeffding's inequality, we have with probability at least 1 − δ T 2 that
where the second inequality is easily verified by substracting RHS from LHS, and the third inequality is by the property of the floor function. Using an union bound over all possible τ and τ ′ , we get that (23) holds for all τ, τ ′ with probability at least 1 − δ.
Now apply (23) to all phases k with v k (s) ≤ v, and sum all of them up. Then we get
Since there are at most SA log 2 T phases, the RHS of (24) is further bounded by 8vD + 2D + 32D log(T 2 /δ) SA log 2 T , which proves this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. 
A) with high probability.
H.1 Proof of Lemma H.2
Proof of Lemma H.2. This lemma says, the stationary distribution of the irreducible Markov chain induced by π 1 k andπ 2 k won't exceed the empirical distribution too much in most steps. To prove Lemma H.2, we will compare three transition probabilities:
and use perturbation analysis to claim that when they are close enough, the stationary distributions they induce will also be close. Here,p k is constructed by counting empirical transitions.p k is only slightly modified fromp k : the last term in the numerator changes from ½ st k+1 −1 ½ st k+1 to ½ st k+1 −1 ½ st k . Under the condition thatπ 2 k is well-defined, t k+1 −1 t=t k ½ st=s = 0 ∀s, which means thatp k has non-zero probability to reach any states from any states, hence inducing an irreducible Markov chain.p k also induces an irreducible Markov chain by Assumption 1. We denote the stationary distributions corresponding top k andp k byμ k andμ k .
We will see thatμ k is exactly the same as the empirical distribution (i.e.,μ k (s) =
). By Theorem C.2, when two transition probabilities are close enough, their stationary distributions will also be close. We will argue that except for a constant amount of steps,
2DS hold for all s, s ′ . When they both hold, we can use Theorem C.2
From the discussion above, Lemma H.2 is proved as long as the three following lemmas (Lemma H.4, H.5, H.6) are proved.
Proof of Lemma H.4. Fix s, s ′ , and k. Consider the martingale difference sequence defined by
where k(t) denotes the phase to which time step t belongs. By Lemma B.2, for any τ ≤ T + 1, with probability at least 1 − 2δ/T ,
Here
With an union bound, we have that (25) holds for all τ with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Now pick τ to be t k+1 , and thus
with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Another union bound over s ′ lets the above inequality holds for all s ′ with probability at least 1 − 2Sδ. Proof of Lemma H.6. We only need to check whether the equationμ k (s
H.2 Proof of Lemma H.3
Proof of Lemma H.3. By Assumption 1, the maximum mean first passage time under model M and policy pair (π
Then by Theorem C.9, we know that if all transition probabilities in the Markov chain induced by (M
) within the amount of 1 8DS 2 , the former's maximum mean first passage time can be bounded by two times the latter's, i.e., T
As a result, to prove this theorem, we only need to bound the number of steps in phases where there exist s, s ′ such that the transition probability difference |p
Our goal is to prove
Fix k. Suppose thatπ 2 k is well-defined. By the definition ofπ 2 k and the triangle inequality, we have
Define ε i := 2 −i , and define
and g k (s, ε) := |G k (s, ε)|, i.e., g k (s, ε) is the number of steps t in phase k such that s t = s and the maximum transition probability error at that step is between ε and 2ε. With these definitions, we can continue to upper bound (26) by
If |p
Note that since steps counted in G k (s, ε) have maximum transition errors greater that ε, by Lemma 5.2, with high probability, k g k (s, ε) won't exceed c1A ε 2 , for some c 1 hides logarithmic terms. Now sum the above equation over phases where E k (s) holds, we get that
holds with high probability. Similar to the proof of Lemma H.1, we use (23) and lower bound k:
. Combining the lower bound and the upper bound, we get k:
Finally, summing over s, we get the desired bound.
I Proofs of Lemma 5.4 and 5.5
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Define notations:
By the construction ofπ 2 k , we havē
where the second equality follows from (30). Substituting (32) and (33) have expectations of zero and should be able to be bounded with Bernstein's inequality. Nevertheless, one needs to be careful about thath k depends onπ 2 k , which is only known after phase k ends. In other words,h k is not F t -measurable for t ∈ ph(k), where F t−1 := {s 1 , a 1 , · · · , s t }. The solution is as follows. Let D be the set whereh k possibly lies. We discretize D and use the Bernstein bound on all discretization points. Finally, we use the fact thath k is not far from the nearest discretization point to bound the sum of Y 's are martingale difference sequences with respect to F t−1 , so we can apply Azuma-Hoeffding's inequality and bound
with probability at least 1 − δ (2DST ) S . Using the union bound, (35) holds for all j with probability at least 1 − δ. Also, there exists a j such that
T . Thus we have
with high probability. We also have k
by Azuma-Hoeffding's inequality. Also,h k (s t k+1 ) −h k (s t k ) ≤ 2D. Collecting terms, we get the desired bound. 
Thus, 
with high probability. The last inequality is by the following Lemma together with Cauchy's inequality. 
where L := i∈K z i .
Proof.
where L i := ℓ∈K:ℓ≤i z i . We used the inequality
J Proofs of Lemma 6.1 and 6.2
Proof of lemma 6.1. Note that for any phase k and any episode i that fully lies in phase k, we have Proof of Lemma 6.2. Suppose that the value iteration halts at iteration N , then under Assumption 2 and by the proof of Lemma F.2, we have
Since ( ) Given δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ, for any 0 < ε < 1, UCSG produces a sequence of policies π
